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Quick overview of Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs)  
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 required at least a mandated volume of biofuel use in the United 
States, called the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007 increased the overall RFS and created nested sub-mandates for advanced biofuels, 
biomass-based diesel, and certain cellulosic biofuels. A more generally accessible article 
outlining the nature of RINs and their relationship to the RFS is available elsewhere.1
1) the gap between the price that fuel blenders pay to buy biofuels and the prices of 
biofuels implicit in blended fuels,  
  
The obligation to meet the mandates falls on fuel blenders, firms that buy input fuels to mix into 
final fuels that they sell to retailers. Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) are the 
mechanism used to make sure each of these firms meets its share of all the mandates. 
Domestically produced and imported biofuels sold to fuel blenders in the U.S. can have RINs. 
Each fuel blender must acquire enough RINs to cover its share of the mandate.  
The RINs are tradable. They are bought and sold so that the mandates will be binding or non-
binding nation-wide. It is not necessary for every blender to use at least their share of the 
mandated amount of biofuels, but each blender is obliged to acquire RINs to meet their 
mandate either by buying the biofuels themselves or by buying RINs from other fuel blenders 
who use extra biofuels and sell extra RINs. 
RIN prices are affected by  
2) the transaction costs of trading RINs, and  
3) speculation about whether or not the mandates will be binding in the near future, as 
well as whether or not there will be a waiver.   
The FAPRI-MU model represents the first component and part of the third component.  
The price gap component is positive if a mandate is binding. A binding mandate is one that 
forces blenders to use more biofuels than they would otherwise. In that case, each additional 
gallon of biofuel blended is at a loss. Blenders have the option to blend biofuels at a loss or buy 
extra RINs from their peers. Blenders will bid the price of RINs up until it is at least as large as 
the loss on the marginal gallon. A high RIN price indicates that the mandate is binding. 
If the mandate is non-binding then the price gap is not positive. There would still be a 
transaction cost element because the price of the RIN must cover the costs of making a deal or 
else blenders with extra RINs will not bother selling them to blenders who want to buy the RIN. 
A RIN price is likely to rise if blenders expect that the mandate will become binding because 
                                                          
1 Thompson, Meyers, and Westhoff. “Renewable Identification Numbers Are the Tracking Instrument 
and Bellwether of US Biofuel Mandates.” Eurochoices. www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122457318/issue. 2009. 
 
 
they have some ability to store RINs for later use. Consequently, observed RIN prices are very 
unlikely to be zero even if all of the mandates are non-binding.  
Introduction to the FAPRI-MU RIN Baseline Table 
FAPRI-MU 2009 baseline projections include markets for RINs that meet the overall, advanced, 
and biodiesel mandates.2 The economic models of these markets consist of equations that 
represent biofuel supplies (tied to the broader FAPRI-MU agricultural markets models), fuel 
blenders’ decisions, and final fuel demand. These equations are slightly revised relative to 
documentation available elsewhere.3 Key revisions relate to rollover and defining implicit RIN 
variables. FAPRI-MU uses this model to generate its baseline and policy analysis.4
Equivalence values, the means to put all RINs on par with corn-based ethanol, are assumed to be 
one except for biodiesel, which was assumed to be 1.5 when the baseline was developed. If true, 
then a biodiesel RIN counts as 1.5 ethanol RINs when adding them up to compare to the 
 
These projections are generated in the FAPRI baseline, but they have not been reported before. 
The August 2009 baseline projects markets forward to the 2014/15 marketing year, but was 
extended in part to illustrate how the RIN markets evolve through 2019/20. 
Highlights of RIN supply and use tables 
Nested mandates cause a RIN price hierarchy. Biodiesel and cellulosic RINs also count towards 
advanced and overall mandates. Advanced RINs automatically count towards the overall 
mandate. The reverse is not true: RINs that count towards the overall mandate do not 
automatically count towards any submandate; and an advanced RIN does not automatically 
meet either biodiesel or cellulosic mandates.  
This nesting means that the price of a sub-mandate RIN can never be less than the price of a 
broader RIN. For example, an advanced RIN can meet either the advanced or the overall 
mandate but a RIN that counts against the overall mandate might not count as advanced, so the 
advanced RIN price cannot be less than the overall RIN price. In the table, advanced and 
conventional RIN prices are the same from 2009/10 to 2013/14. 
                                                          
2 The cellulosic mandate is assumed to be waived in the 2009 baseline. 
3 “Model of the U.S. Ethanol Market.” FAPRI-MU Report #07-08. July 2008. 
4 “Impacts of Selected US Ethanol Policy Options” FAPRI-MU #04-09, May, 2009; "Biofuels: Impact of 
Selected Farm Bill Provisions and other Biofuel Policy Options" FAPRI-MU #06-08, June, 2008;  
Thompson, Meyer, and Westhoff, "How Does Petroleum Price and Corn Yield Volatility Affect Ethanol 
Markets with and without an Ethanol Use Mandate?" Energy Policy, February, 2009; and Thompson, 
Meyer, and Westhoff, "Mandate Economics Applied to US Biofuel Policies," presented at the annual 
meeting of the IATRC, December 2008. For others, see http://www.fapri.missouri.edu. 
 
 
advanced and overall mandates. Taking into account both the equivalence value and the RIN 
hierarchy, the biodiesel RIN price must be at least 1.5 times more than the price of an ethanol 
RIN that meets the advanced mandate. In these projections, the biodiesel RIN price is more than 
1.5 times the advanced RIN price through 2013/14, then biodiesel RIN prices are set by their 
value as an advanced biofuel. 
The cellulosic mandate is assumed to be waived. Cellulosic biofuels are a component of two 
broader mandates, and both are reduced by the same amount as the cellulosic biofuels given the 
waiver. We assume the cellulosic RIN price equals its effective limit, or allowance value, imposed 
by legislation in the event of a waiver. 
One or more of the mandates are binding in most years of the simulations, particularly as they 
grow over time, but not all. If a mandate is not binding, then the price of RINs that meet that 
mandate fall towards zero, as in the case of the conventional RIN at the end of the period. 
(There would still be a price to cover transaction costs that we do not include here.) If a mandate 
is binding, then the value of RINs that meet that mandate will rise.  
Rollover provisions are expected to allow up to 20% of one year’s mandate to be met by RINs 
issued in the previous year. Blenders have an incentive to overshoot the mandates in any year 
in order to have a buffer for the next one – behavior analogous to carry out of a commodity. We 
expect RIN rollover will depend on the RIN price and future increases in the mandated volume.  
RINs not submitted to meet their own mandate at the end of one year can go to any of two or three 
other uses. First, they can be used for rollover up to the regulatory limit. Second, they can expire 
after at least one year without ever being used for compliance. The third option for all but 
overall RINs is that they can be used to meet a broader mandate. Submandate RINs used to 
help satisfy a broader mandate are demoted. The nested mandates means that biodiesel 
mandates automatically meet advanced or total mandates, as well as their own. The reverse is 
not true: overall RINs cannot be used to meet any submandate and advanced RINs cannot be 
used to meet biodiesel or cellulosic mandates.  
Some advanced RINs are demoted in the early years to help meet the overall RFS and biodiesel 
RINs are demoted to help with the increasingly challenging advanced RFS by the end of the 
period. From 2018/19, the amount of conventional RIN carry out for the overall mandate hits the 
rollover limit, so the rest of these RINs above that limit expire. At that point, the conventional 
RIN price (ignoring transaction costs) falls to zero. 
We requested historical data, but none are yet available so all RIN data are estimated. Data are 
averaged over crop years, even though the mandates operate on a calendar year basis, to 
coordinate with feedstock market models.  
 
 
 
 
Notes. Qualifying carry out RINs are those RINs not used for compliance with their designated mandate, not used for a broader 
mandate, and within the 20% rollover limit. RIN values reflect estimates of the core RIN value (price gap) and RIN rollover 
speculation , but do not include estimates of transaction costs or speculation about possible waiver for any of biodiesel, advanced, 
or overall mandates. The mandate for biofuels made from cellulosic and agricultural feedstocks (cellulosic) is assumed to be waived, 
so the number here reflects a lower level that is assumed to be used in this event, and the allowance value is used as the relevant 
RIN price.  
Biofuel RIN Supply and Utilization: Crop Year
09/10 10/11 11/12 12/13 13/14 14/15 15/16 16/17 17/18 18/19 19/20
(Million gallons)
Renewable Fuel Standard 12,277 13,440 14,431 15,404 16,362 17,524 18,409 19,137 19,913 20,737 21,279
  Advanced biofuels 777 1,040 1,431 1,804 2,162 2,724 3,409 4,137 4,913 5,737 6,279
    Cellulosic ethanol (waived) 11 24 64 137 245 391 576 804 1,079 1,404 1,779
    Biodiesel 600 750 933 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Biodiesel RFS RINs (Million RIN-gallons)
  Production 617 765 925 1,002 1,011 1,007 1,063 1,143 1,216 1,282 1,332
  Carry In 55 73 87 79 82 92 99 88 81 75 70
  Use for biodiesel compliance 600 750 933 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
  Unused for this mandate 73 87 79 82 92 99 163 230 297 358 402
      of which, carry out 73 87 79 82 92 99 88 81 75 70 71
      of which, demoted 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 149 221 288 331
Advanced RFS RINs
  Production 1,212 1,527 1,847 2,051 2,217 2,610 3,383 4,129 4,899 5,698 6,301
   Biodiesel (in ethanol gallons) 927 1,147 1,387 1,504 1,516 1,511 1,595 1,714 1,823 1,923 1,998
   Cellulosic 11 24 64 137 245 391 576 804 1,079 1,404 1,779
   Other Advanced 276 356 395 411 456 709 1,212 1,611 1,996 2,371 2,524
  Carry In 130 184 267 343 380 429 315 289 281 267 228
  Use for advanced compliance 777 1,040 1,431 1,804 2,162 2,724 3,409 4,137 4,913 5,737 6,279
  Unused for this mandate 567 671 683 590 435 315 289 281 267 228 250
      of which, carry out 184 267 343 380 429 315 289 281 267 228 250
      of which, demoted 383 404 340 210 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total RFS RINs
  Production 12,658 13,897 14,764 15,233 16,021 17,091 18,413 19,661 20,837 21,769 22,964
   Biodiesel (in ethanol gallons) 927 1,147 1,387 1,504 1,516 1,511 1,595 1,714 1,823 1,923 1,998
   Cellulosic 11 24 64 137 245 391 576 804 1,079 1,404 1,779
   Other Advanced 276 356 395 411 456 709 1,212 1,611 1,996 2,371 2,524
   Conventional 11,446 12,370 12,917 13,182 13,804 14,481 15,030 15,532 15,938 16,070 16,663
  Carry In 1,840 2,223 2,680 3,013 2,842 2,501 2,069 2,073 2,597 3,521 4,181
  Use for total compliance 12,277 13,440 14,431 15,404 16,362 17,524 18,409 19,137 19,913 20,737 21,279
  Unused for this mandate 2,223 2,680 3,013 2,842 2,501 2,069 2,073 2,597 3,521 4,552 5,866
      of which, carry out 2,223 2,680 3,013 2,842 2,501 2,069 2,073 2,597 3,521 4,181 4,256
      of which, expired 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 372 1,610
RIN value (Dollars per RIN-gallon)
   Biodiesel RIN 0.53 0.57 0.72 0.69 0.58 0.51 0.63 0.70 0.75 0.81 0.80
   Cellulosic RIN allowance val. 0.74 1.03 0.92 0.84 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.58 0.53
   Other Adv. RIN 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.34 0.42 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.53
   Conventional RIN 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.00 0.00
RIN compliance expend. (Million Dollars)
   Total 1,145 809 814 1,492 2,383 3,519 4,150 4,005 3,269 2,903 3,134
